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ISLAM IN THE MIND OF AMERICAN 
COURTS: 1800 TO 1960 
Marie A. Failinger* 
Abstract: While there are relatively few cases from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that mention Muslims or Islam, an analysis of these 
cases discloses three common themes. First, Islam was seen as a decidedly 
non-American religion. Second, Islam was often used to illustrate world-
wide acceptance of a legal principle, reflecting on core common values be-
tween people of different faiths. Third, religious tolerance extended be-
yond traditional Christian ideologies to encompass Islam, at least in theory 
if not in practice. These three themes display how judges used often-faulty 
notions of Muslims and Islam to justify their conclusions, and highlight the 
genesis of many stereotypes and insensitivities still prevalent in the modern 
era. 
Introduction 
 Within the U.S. resident population, Muslims are estimated to 
make up only about three to eight million people, although their 
numbers are growing.1 Yet, due in part to the events of September 11, 
they have loomed larger in the American mind than their numbers 
suggest. Anxiety over Muslims as “the other” has spilled over into a sub-
stantial incidence of civil rights violations, including government sur-
veillance, detention efforts, and immigration restrictions.2 In modern 
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1 Richard Freeland, The Treatment of Muslims in American Courts, 12 Islam & Christian-
Muslim Religion 449, 449 (2001) (noting that the number of mosques and Islamic centers 
in the United States is estimated at seven hundred to two thousand, with populations concen-
trated in California, New York, Chicago and other strong populations in Michigan, Texas, 
Indiana, and Ohio); Tom W. Smith, Religious Diversity in America: The Emergence of Muslims, 
Buddhists, Hindus, and Others, 41 J. for Sci. Study Religion 577, 577 (2002) (noting that the 
Muslim population is usually overestimated by three to four times its size and that artificial 
year-to-year gains have been posted by some statistical compilations). 
2 See, e.g., Deborah J. Schildkraut, The More Things Change . . . American Identity and Mass 
and Elite Responses to 9/11, 23 Pol. Psychol. 511, 520 (2002) (describing proposed immi-
1 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
era American jurisprudence, Muslims are probably most visibly repre-
sented in federal cases on detention and prosecution of suspected ter-
rorists at Guantanamo Bay, though there is an even larger number of 
cases involving the religious freedom rights of Muslim prisoners.3 
 This emerging interest in Muslims as subjects of American juris-
prudence prompts an important question: how have Muslims and their 
religion been imagined by American judges? The courts can both re-
flect American social attitudes and shape them, countering mispercep-
tions and stereotypes that result in social and legal harm to minorities. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history of Muslims 
in America. Part II describes U.S. immigration policy and its effect on 
Muslim immigrants. Part III catalogues how Muslims and Islam are de-
scribed in federal and state court cases during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Finally, Part IV describes the three common themes 
that pervade these cases. Although most mentions of Islam in these 
cases are very brief, and in most cases gratuitous, together they shed 
light on the social attitudes of judges in this period toward Muslim im-
migrants and some aspects of Islamic jurisprudence. The survey ends 
before 1960, at which point some modern African-Americans began to 
embrace Islam as an authentic part of their tradition and caused a shift 
in how the courts encountered Islam. 
I. Muslims in American History 
 For the most part, with the exception of recent work, the early his-
tory of Muslims in the United States is difficult to ferret out from the 
standard texts not focused on American Muslim history. Many of the 
well-known American religious histories written through the middle of 
the twentieth century barely mention Muslims at all.4 If they are men-
                                                                                                                      
 
gration restrictions for student visas from Middle Eastern countries and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation interviews of Middle Eastern men); Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Intern-
ment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the United 
States, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 407, 537–38 (2005) (discussing special registration of Arab and Mus-
lim immigrants and contingency plans for interning them before 9/11). See generally Susan 
M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 295 (2002) (discuss-
ing the effects of the September 11 attacks on Muslim Americans). 
3 See Freeland, supra note 1, at 455–56; Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: 
The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 
Md. L. Rev. 805, 806–09 (2007). 
4 See generally Robert Baird, Religion in America (1979) (neglecting to mention 
Muslims or Islam in tracing America’s religious roots); Edwin Scott Gaustad, A Reli-
gious History of America (1st ed. 1966) (same); Edwin Scott Gaustad, Faith of our 
Fathers: Religion and the New Nation (1987) (same); William Lee Miller, The 
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tioned, it is generally in connection with the conquest of Spain or the 
rise of the Nation of Islam in the 1960s.5 Similarly, it is difficult to find 
an American legal history of note that discusses the role of Muslims in 
American law.6 
A. Muslims in Early American History 
 There are, however, a growing number of texts on both the his-
torical experience of American Muslims and their contemporary con-
cerns.7 Histories recording the experience of Muslims in America be-
                                                                                                                      
 
First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic (1986) (same); William Warren 
Sweet, Religion in Colonial America (1st ed. 1942) (same); William Warren Sweet, 
The Story of Religion in America (3d ed. 1950) (same). 
5 See, e.g., Mary Farrell Bednarowski, American Religion: A Cultural Perspec-
tive 74–77, 147 (1984) (discussing the history of the Nation of Islam); Martin E. Marty, 
Pilgrims in their Own Land: 500 Years of Religion in America 12–14, 17–18, 444–47 
(2d ed. 1984) (discussing the conquest of Spain in 711 A.D., the later expulsion of the 
“Moors,” and the rise of the Nation of Islam under Elijah Muhammad and his conflict with 
Malcolm X); R. Laurence Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans 
182, 192–94 (1986) (discussing Edward Blyden’s advocacy of Islam “as a religion better 
suited for free blacks than Christianity” and the growth of Islam among African-Americans 
in the 1950s and 1960s). 
6 See, e.g., Stephen Botein, Early American Law and Society, at vii–viii, 138 (1980) 
(lacking index or table of contents headings on Muslims); Paul D. Carrington, Stew-
ards of Democracy: Law as a Public Profession, at vii–viii, 304 (1999) (same); Law-
rence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 7–8, 639–42 (1973) (same); Grant 
Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, at v, 152 (1977) (same); Kermit L. Hall et al., 
American Legal History: Cases and Materials, at xiii–xxiv (2d ed. 1996) (same); 
James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers, at vi–xiii, 495 
(1950) (same); Law in American History, at iii–iv (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn 
eds., 1971) (same); Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in the 
Law, at vii, 263 (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981) (same); Jonathan Lurie, Law and the Na-
tion: 1865–1910, at vii–ix, 178 (1st ed., 1983) (same); Roscoe Pound, The Formative 
Era of American Law, at xi, 183–84 (1938) (same); Bernard Schwartz, The Law in 
America: A History, at vii–x, 379 (1974) (same); The Life of the Law: Readings on 
the Growth of Legal Institutions, at ix–xiv, 580 ( John Honnold ed., 1964) (same); 
Two Centuries of Growth in American Law: 1701–1901, at viii, 533 (Yale Law Sch. 
Faculty eds., 1901) (same). See generally Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal His-
tory (Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. eds., 1968) (same); Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law in Antebellum 
Society: Essays and Materials in Law and American Society (1980) (same). As with 
the religious history texts, there are occasional references to the conquest of Spain by the 
Moors. See Max Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History 6–7 (1936). Hall 
and Karsten also mention the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld terrorism cases. 
See Kermit l. Hall & Peter Karsten, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 
353–54 (2009). 
7 See generally Edward E. Curtis IV, Muslims in America: A Short History (2009) 
(describing the practice of Islam in America); Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, A History of 
Islam in America: From the New World to the New World Order (2010) (same); 
4 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
fore the nineteenth century are sparse, and largely focus on individual 
Muslims whose exploits caught the eye of non-Muslim journalists and 
historians. Although philanthropist Amir Mohammed documents Mus-
lim presence in the New World as early as 1312—when African Muslims 
arrived at the Gulf of Mexico on an exploratory mission—most histo-
ries suggests that the first significant Muslim presence in the New 
World was Esevanico Dorantes, who came in 1527 with a Portuguese 
explorer.8 According to Race Capet, Dorantes was a Morisco, or a birth-
Muslim whom the Portuguese enslaved and converted to Christianity.9 
Conversion, or at least secretive practice of Islam, was necessary in part 
because Spain restricted Muslims, Jews, and Gypsies from coming to the 
New World.10 Another noted early American of Muslim heritage was 
Anthony Jansen van Salee, the son of a Dutch privateer and Moroccan 
woman, who settled in New Netherland as part of the Dutch attempt to 
challenge Spain’s hegemony in the New World.11 
B. Muslims and Slavery in America 
 Beyond these early explorers and the occasional free Muslim men-
tioned in early histories, recent historians of Muslim America suggest 
that the most significant influx of Muslims before the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was slaves.12 Although authors of Ameri-
                                                                                                                      
 
Amir Nashid Ali Muhammad, Muslims in America: Seven Centuries of History 
(1312–1998) (1st ed. 1998) (same). 
8 GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 10–11; Muhammad, supra note 7, at 3; Freeland, su-
pra note 1, at 450; Race Capet, Created Equal: Slavery and America’s Muslim Heritage, Cross 
Currents, Dec. 2010, at 549, 549–50. Amir Nashid Ali Muhammad notes that Christopher 
Columbus had Muslim crew members with him and was influenced by Arab scholar Al-
Idrissi’s work discussing “the discovery of a new continent by eight Muslim explorers.” 
Muhammad, supra note 7, at 3. Race Capet describes Dorantes’s travel to Florida in 1527, 
but Richard Freeland states that he arrived with Marcos de Niza in 1539. Freeland, supra 
note 1, at 450; Capet, supra, at 549. Kambiz GhaneaBassiri states that he accompanied his 
master on an expedition led by Pamfilo de Narváez to the Gulf Coast in 1527, wandered as 
captives of native tribes for about six years, and then traveled with Álvar Nuñez Cabeza de 
Vaca for eight years into western Mexico. GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 11–12. Capet 
notes that he went from Florida to New Mexico and Arizona before being killed by the 
Zuni, while GhaneaBassiri describes him serving the Zuni as a medicine man and being 
killed at the Pueblo of Háwikuh. Id. at 12; Capet, supra, at 550. 
9 Capet, supra note 8, at 549–50. 
10 See GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 28, 35, 85 (noting use of conversion by well-
known slaves to boost favor with whites); Freeland, supra note 1, at 450 (noting the ways in 
which Muslims secretly retained their practices, such as writing work in Arabic); Capet, 
supra note 8, at 550–51. 
11 See GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
12 Muhammad, supra note 7, at 9; Freeland, supra note 1, at 450. Muhammad notes that 
“Moors” from the Barbary Coast—captured by the Portuguese and enslaved—successfully 
2012] Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800–1960 5 
can history commonly acknowledge that Muslims were among the slaves 
imported into the United States, recent scholarship suggests that they 
were more numerous than previously thought, and that many practiced 
their faith or a syncretic version of Islam and Christianity well into the 
nineteenth century.13 Modern histories suggest that Muslim slaves were 
likely better educated and more often from elite backgrounds than 
other slaves.14 Many Muslim slaves may have acted out of self-interest, 
believing themselves superior to black slaves and attempted to gain “bet-
ter treatment and possibly passage back to Africa.”15 Kambiz Ghanea-
Bassiri argues that African Muslims were both “de-negrofied” and “de-
Islamicized.”16 He claims that they were aware of the ways in which 
American slavery dehumanized people based on race and color, and 
often tried to disassociate themselves from other Africans by claiming 
that they were not black but Arabians or Moors.17 At the same time, 
American writers attempted to present well-known slaves as either Chris-
tian converts or exceptions to the “licentiousness and despotism” that, 
in the popular mind, characterized the Ottoman Empire and its citi-
zens.18 
 A small number of Muslim slaves gained notoriety in white culture; 
for example, Job Ben Solomon, son of a respected Islamic scholar, 
                                                                                                                      
petitioned South Carolina authorities for their freedom in 1753 and a 1786 appearance of 
two foreigners who sailed from Algeria to Virginia, where they were arrested. Muhammad, 
supra note 7, at 7–8. Muhammad also records the exploits of Yusef Benenhaly, who fought in 
the American Revolution and followed General Thomas Sumter to South Carolina, where his 
descendants were “known as the ‘Turks of Sumter County.’” Id. at 9. 
13 See Curtis, supra note 7, at 20–21 (describing syncretic Islamic and hoodoo prac-
tices of slaves); GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 63–64, 80–96 (describing Islamic-faith 
among slaves); Freeland, supra note 1, at 450–51. Freeland notes that not all Muslim slaves 
were black Africans; Malaysians and Turks were also enslaved because Christians could own 
“infidels” whereas “infidels” could not own Christian slaves. Freeland, supra note 1, at 450–
51. He traces how slavery became racialized as slaves became Christians. See id. at 451; see 
also Capet, supra note 8, at 551 (2010) (citing Allan Austin’s estimation that there may have 
been at least eighteen thousand Muslim slaves imported from 1771 to 1775). Among the 
cases witnessing to the existence of likely Muslim slaves are Hodge v. Montgomery, which 
discussed the gift of slaves, one of whom had the common Muslim name Fatima, and Bank 
of South Carolina v. Mitchell, which also discussed a slave named Fatima. See Hodge v. Mont-
gomery, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 268, 268, 271 (1843); Bank of S.C. v. Mitchell, 14 S.C. Eq. 
(Rice Eq.) 389, 390, 397 (1839). 
14 Capet, supra note 8, at 552, 559. 
15 See GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
16 Id. at 18, 27 (emphasis omitted). 
17 Id. at 21–22. GhaneaBassiri notes that a Moorish identity may have captured the 
public imagination, the public having heard tales of white slavery coming out of the exotic 
and well-known Barbary Wars. Id. at 25. 
18 Id. at 27–29; see Curtis, supra note 7, at 1–4. 
6 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
emerged from slavery in a Kent Island, Maryland, tobacco shed to be-
come the toast of the town in London and later gained his freedom in 
Gambia.19 Eight Muslim slaves successfully petitioned the South Caro-
lina House of Representatives for their freedom in 1790, describing the 
perfidy of the English captain who promised to redeem them back to 
Morocco as captives of war but sold them as slaves in the New World 
instead.20 The white public also may have learned of Bilali Muham-
mad—a head overseer of a Georgia plantation who orchestrated its de-
fense against the British in the War of 1812—or Omar ibn Said, the ear-
liest known Arabic scribe in America who penned an autobiography 
about life as a slave in 1831.21 Capet suggests that among the most fa-
mous of Muslim slaves was Abdul Rahahman (Rahman), whose master 
granted his freedom at the request of Senator Henry Clay.22 Rahahman 
later went on a speaking tour in the Northeast to raise the funds to buy 
his children out of slavery and then settled in Liberia.23 
 Although much of the Muslim African slave culture seems to have 
died out in the early nineteenth century, African-American communi-
ties became interested in re-connecting with their Islamic roots as early 
as the late nineteenth century.24 Edward Wilmot Blyden, a Christian 
Liberian diplomat, promoted Islam on the U.S. lecture circuit in the 
1870s and ’80s as an appropriate alternative for those of African heri-
tage.25 In the early twentieth century, three movements attempted to 
put Muslim ideals into the American mind. First, in the early 1920s, 
Muhammad Sadiq’s Ahmadi movement stressed the evils of American 
racism, attracted significant support from African-Americans, and also 
figured prominently in Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement 
Association. Second, Timothy Drew established the Moorish Science 
Temple in Chicago in 1925, claiming that African-Americans were of 
Moorish (Moroccan) and Asiatic descent, and that Islam was the origi-
nal religion of his people. Finally, Wallace D. Fard established the Na-
                                                                                                                      
19 See Curtis, supra note 7, at 1–4; Capet, supra note 8, at 552–56. 
20 Capet, supra note 8, at 556. One of those eight Muslim slaves was named Fatima. Id. 
21 See GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 62, 67; Ghada Osman & Camille F. Forbes, Rep-
resenting the West in the Arabic Language: The Slave Narrative of Omar ibn Said, 15 J. Islamic 
Stud. 331, 331–32 (2004). 
22 Capet, supra note 8, at 557; see also GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
23 Capet, supra note 8, at 557. 
24 See Freeland, supra note 1, at 451. 
25 See id. 
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tion of Islam in 1930, recruiting Elijah Poole, later Elijah Muhammed, 
as his successor.26 
C. Immigration of Muslims to the United States 
 Between the Civil War and the twentieth century, the Muslim popu-
lation in the United States grew primarily by conversion and immigra-
tion, according to Professor Richard Freeland.27 There were a small 
number of prominent Caucasian conversions to Islam around the turn 
of the twentieth century, such as Methodist minister Reverend Norman 
and the U.S. Manila consul Alexander Russell Webb in 1887.28 Webb 
was a Presbyterian-turned-Theosophist-turned-Muslim missionary, whose 
periodical The Muslim World and book Islam in America made Muslims 
visible to a larger public.29 Muslim and Muslim-offshoot missionaries 
like Indian religious leaders Inayat Khan and Muhammad Sadiq lec-
tured throughout the United States, though many white Americans at-
tended their presentations out of curiosity for the exotic rather than 
interest in the message.30 Muslim culture also greatly influenced Ameri-
can author Ralph Waldo Emerson, particularly “Islamic social values 
such as hospitality, personal nobility, and regard for women.”31 
                                                                                                                     
 In measuring the growth of Islam by immigration, historians had 
difficulty estimating the numbers of Muslim immigrants during the 
nineteenth century, in part because immigration officials before 1899 
classified anyone from Ottoman territories as either from “‘Turkey in 
Asia’” (Syrians, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, and others from that same 
region) or from “‘Turkey in Europe’” (including Albanians, Bosnians, 
 
26 Curtis, supra note 7, at 31–32, 34; GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 223–24. The Na-
tion of Islam was not orthodox Islam, although Fard also preached that Islam was the 
original religion of African-Americans. Curtis, supra note 7, at 36–37. Elijah Poole came 
to believe that Wallace Fard was not only the Messiah (or Mahdi) but God in the flesh, and 
that he was God’s messenger. Id. at 37. Fard disappeared in 1934; Poole endured a power 
struggle for succession and became leader of the Chicago Temple. Id. The federal gov-
ernment later prosecuted him as a draft dodger and traitor during World War II, another 
victim of J. Edgar Hoover’s fear of internal, subversive groups. Id. at 37–38. 
27 Freeland, supra note 1, at 451. 
28 Curtis, supra note 7, at 26–27; Freeland, supra note 1, at 451. 
29 Curtis, supra note 7, at 25, 28. 
30 See id. at 29–31. Unbeknownst to most Americans, Sadiq was not an orthodox Mus-
lim; he believed that the founder of his sect, Ghulam Ahmad, was the Messiah who would 
bring in the Day of Judgment. Id. at 31. Khan was a Sufi Muslim who focused on the unity 
of Islam with other great religions, but his failure to convert American audiences led him 
to move to Europe, leaving behind one of the oldest operating Sufi organizations in the 
United States, the Sufi Order International. Id. at 29–30. 
31 See Suzan Jameel Fakahani, Islamic Influences on Emerson’s Thought: The Fascination of a 
Nineteenth Century American Writer, 18 J. Muslim Minority Aff. 291, 291, 298 (1998). 
8 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
Croats, Serbs, and Macedonians).32 This inability to identify Muslims 
stems partly from the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to allow Muslims to 
emigrate during this period, which encouraged immigrants to hide 
their religious identities.33 Moreover, immigration numbers are hard to 
estimate because many emigrants from countries with large Muslim 
populations spent significant time in other European countries before 
coming to the United States.34 Furthermore, Americans tended to wel-
come Christians from European countries and associated Muslims with 
negative stereotypes of the Ottoman Empire, which encouraged Mus-
lims to downplay their faith.35 
 In the 1870s, Syrians—particularly those from Lebanon and Pales-
tine—began a noticeable wave of immigration that has been attributed 
to the Ottoman regime’s oppression or their desire to take advantage 
of the economic opportunities offered by the United States.36 Then, at 
the turn of the twentieth century, Turks, Kurds, and Eastern European 
Muslims began to emigrate, either to look for work or simply to escape 
oppression.37 Among the best documented immigrants were the Alba-
nians, arriving in small numbers in the 1880s and larger numbers after 
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912.38 Albanian immigrants largely 
downplayed their Muslim identity during this period.39 
 Some Muslims, however, created a community culture centered 
around Islam. Syrian Muslims settled in North Dakota, where they be-
gan homesteading in the early 1900s, and Muslims attracted by well-
paying jobs in Henry Ford’s auto plant settled in Detroit.40 Muslim en-
claves could also be found in major Midwestern cities such as Chicago, 
Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Akron, and major cities in the 
East such as New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and the Boston area.41 
                                                                                                                      
32 GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 137–38. 
33 Id. at 141. 
34 Id. at 138. 
35 Id. at 141–42. 
36 Id. at 139–40; Freeland, supra note 1, at 451. GhaneaBassiri also notes that this im-
migration was furthered by prominent American missionaries to Syria, who helped create 
a private education system and facilitated Syrians’ interest in immigration. GhaneaBas-
siri, supra note 7, at 139. Of Syrian immigrants, the majority were Christian, but approxi-
mately eight thousand of the two hundred thousand Syrians in the United States in 1924 
were Muslim. Id. at 140. 
37 GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 144–45. 
38 Id. at 146–47. 
39 Id. at 146. 
40 See Curtis, supra note 7, at 47–49, 53–54; GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 140. 
41 Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 137. 
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II. Exclusionary Immigration Policies and the treatment of 
Muslims and People from Muslim-Dominated  
Countries in American Courts 
 Perhaps the most significant factor preventing the large-scale im-
migration of Muslims to America was racialization.42 Immigration from 
East Asia all but halted due to the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1882, the 
exclusion of Japanese immigrants in 1908, and the creation of an Asiatic 
Barred Zone in 1917.43 Thus, laws negatively affected immigration from 
many countries where Islam was prominent.44 The addition of literacy 
requirements in 1917 and the exclusion of “‘polygamists[] or persons 
who admit their belief in the practice of polygamy’” in the Immigration 
Act of 1891 acted as further barriers to Muslim immigration.45 Perhaps 
the most damaging to Muslim immigration was the Immigration Act of 
1924, which reduced existing country immigration quotas and disfa-
vored countries outside of northern and western Europe.46 All countries 
outside the Asiatic Barred Zone that had significant Muslim populations 
were given immigration quotas of one hundred per year.47 This restric-
tive immigration policy began to unravel with the McCarran-Walter Act 
of 1952 and further loosened with immigration reforms in 1965.48 
                                                                                                                      
 
42See id. at 150, 152. 
43 Id. at 150–51; see Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed by McCatran-
Walter Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163); see, e.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 
(repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600). The 1917 act excluded from ad-
mission any persons on the continent of Asia, unless they were natives of islands already 
possessed by the United States. Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 150 n.58; accord § 3, 39 
Stat. at 876. 
44 See Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 150–51. 
45 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084; Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 150–51. 
46 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (amended by McCarran-Walter Act of 
1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163); GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 151; Freeland, supra note 1, at 
451. The Acts reduced the country quotas to two percent of the existing U.S. population 
from that country and reduced the total immigration influx to one hundred and fifty 
thousand per annum. GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 151. The Acts also barred from 
immigration any person ineligible for citizenship, meaning that Asians previously declared 
ineligible for citizenship could no longer immigrate. Id. 
47 Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 151. 
48 Freeland, supra note 1, at 452. See generally McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537). The McCarran-Walter Act 
eliminated racial restrictions on immigration but kept country quotas and imposed a pref-
erence for immigrants with special skills. §§ 201–203, 66 Stat. at 175–78; Matthew T. Hovey, 
Comment, Oh, I’m Sorry, Did That Identity Belong to You? How Ignorance, Ambiguity, and Iden-
tity Theft Create Opportunity for Immigration Reform in the United States, 54 Vill. L. Rev. 369, 
374 n.32 (2009). Freeland notes that Muslim immigrants arriving at that time were edu-
cated Palestinians (arriving after the Palestinian upheaval in 1948) and Iraqis (arriving 
10 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
 Along with immigration restrictions, federal naturalization law 
created a significant hardship for immigrants from predominantly Mus-
lim countries who attempted to become citizens. “The Naturalization 
Act of 1790 granted citizenship only ‘to aliens being free white per-
sons,’” though Congress amended it in 1870 to permit “citizenship ‘to 
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.’”49 In many 
of the cases in the early 1900s, the position of the U.S. government was 
that the 1790 Naturalization Act—permitting only “free white persons” 
to become citizens—applied only to persons living in Europe at the 
founding of the United States and their descendants.50 
 Consequently, those who could not claim European descent, most 
prominently Syrians and Indians, fought significant court battles be-
ginning in 1909 to establish that they were “white.”51 These cases are a 
painful reminder of the ways in which American racism both co-opted 
and stigmatized immigrants of other nationalities. For example, Judge 
Smith of the South Carolina District Court pronounced Syrians “non-
white” but later granted a re-hearing, noting that “[d]eep feeling has 
been manifested on the part of the Syrian immigrants because of what 
has been termed by them the humiliation inflicted upon, and mortifi-
cation suffered by, Syrians in America . . . .”52 He reasoned that Syrians 
should be no more humiliated by denial of citizenship than the “edu-
cated and cultivated” Chinese, Japanese, Mongolians, or Native Ameri-
cans also excluded from citizenship.53 On the other hand, he pointed 
out that the 1870 amendments “admit to citizenship the very race [of 
African-Americans the Syrians] term inferior.”54 On the other hand, an 
                                                                                                                      
beginning in 1958), followed by Iranians and Pakistanis in the 1980s. Freeland, supra note 
1, at 452. 
49 Act of Jul. 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (amended by Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 
596); Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 
Stat. 414); GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 152. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1910); In re Ellis, 179 F. 
1002, 1003 (D. Or. 1910); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 837 (D. Mass. 1909). At least one 
court noted the 1870 addition to the naturalization statute of “‘aliens of African nativity 
and . . . persons of African descent.’” See Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 813 (E.D.S.C. 1913) 
(quoting Act of Jul. 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254). 
51 See Ghaneabassiri, supra note 7, at 152–53. One example of an Indian immigration 
appeal is United States v. Balsara, in which a Parsi, a descendant of immigrants from Persia 
into India in the eighth century, was found to be “white” because he came from a settle-
ment of Parsis “by themselves of intelligent and well-to-do-persons, principally engaged in 
commerce, [who] are as distinct from the Hindus as are the English who dwell in India.” 
180 F. at 695. 
52 In re Dow, 213 F. 355, 356 (E.D.S.C. 1914). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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undertone of mistrust pervades some cases involving Syrians.55 Com-
menting on the “evasive and insincere” witnesses in a bankruptcy trial, 
the court seemingly explained: “[t]hey are all Syrians.”56 
 In keeping with the popular stigmatization of Muslims and those 
who come from predominantly Muslim countries, some courts took 
great pains to identify claimants as Christians, implying that this is a fa-
vorable factor in determining immigration status.57 They also went into 
great detail about what standard of “whiteness” should be used, some of 
them determining that Syrians were white and others that they were 
not.58 Thus, while the Oregon District Court found a Syrian to be 
“white” based on the popular usage of the term, the South Carolina Dis-
trict Court adopted the government’s proffered “European” meaning of 
“white,” pronouncing the need for a clear dividing line in a history 
shaped by intermarriage of races.59 The South Carolina District Court 
thus determined that Albanians, Spanish, and Portuguese “Moors” are 
white, while “all inhabitants of Asia, Australia, the South Seas, the Malay-
sian Islands and territories, and of South America” are not unless they 
can show European descent.60 Noting that Syrians can be “of pure or 
almost pure Jewish, Turkish, or Greek blood” due to “another Semitic 
conquest in the shape of the Arabian Mahometan eruption, then again 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Abdo v. Townshend, 282 F. 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1922); see also In re Hatem, 161 F. 
895, 896 (E.D.N.C. 1908). 
56 Abdo, 282 F. at 478, 480 (noting, however, that they are intelligent and good busi-
nessmen); see also In re Hatem, 161 F. at 896 (noting that the bankrupt and his witnesses 
might be exposed to prejudice because they were Syrians, but suggesting that they were 
liars nonetheless). 
57 See, e.g., Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 812 (noting that the claimant was a Christian); In re 
Ellis, 179 F. at 1002 (noting that the claimant was a Palestinian and a Maronite); In re Hal-
ladjian, 174 F. at 841 (discussing the Christian history of the Armenians, which was the 
claimants’ ancestry). 
58 See, e.g., Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 816–17; In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1003–04. 
59 Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 814–15; In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1004. But in Balsara, where the 
court rejected the government’s argument that “white” referred to those persons immi-
grating to the United States in 1790, namely northern and western Europeans, because it 
would exclude Russians, Poles, Italians, Greeks, and “Hebrews,” which the court found 
absurd. See 180 F. at 695–96. The Court concluded that Congress must have meant to dis-
tinguish the white race from “black, red, yellow, or brown races, which differ in so many 
respects from it.” Id. at 696. The court, however, also rejected the argument of amici curiae 
that the term “white” was meant only to exclude African-Americans and later-excluded 
groups like the Chinese. Id. at 696–97. Noting that the immigration form requires appli-
cants to state their color and complexion, the court implied that the law continues to be 
concerned with the race of immigration applicants. Id. 
60 Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 814–16. 
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overlaid by the Mongolian and Turkish conquests,” the court held that a 
“Syrian of Asiatic birth and descent” cannot be naturalized.61 
 In a third case, Judge Lowell of the District of Massachusetts, after 
noting that the Christian Armenian claimants’ “complexion was lighter 
than that of many south Italians and Portuguese,” did an extensive 
analysis of possible meanings of “race.”62 He rejected the government’s 
position that “‘the average man in the street . . . would find no difficulty 
in assigning to the yellow race a Turk or Syrian with as much ease as he 
would bestow that designation on a Chinaman or a Korean.’”63 Focus-
ing at length on centuries of “racial” intermingling, the District of Mas-
sachusetts ultimately read “white” expansively to include all persons not 
otherwise classified as “Negro,” American Indian, Chinese, or Japa-
nese.64 
 In these cases, the characterization of ostensibly not Christian 
Turks is not only harsh but not always clearly related to the immigra-
tion issue under discussion.65 Although Judge Lowell at one point— 
perhaps in jest—described the Armenian turn to Christianity “without 
reproach to the followers of Mohammed or of Zoroaster,” he made sev-
eral references to Turkish domination through violence and Armenian 
resistance to the Turks.66 Judge Lowell noted that Turks “both socially 
and sexually, commingled with Europeans to an unusual degree,” utiliz-
ing Europeans as sexual partners, architects, and generals, and offering 
conquered Christian peoples conversion as an alternative to extermina-
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 816. 
62 In re Halladjian, 174 F. at 835. 
63 Id. at 838; see also United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 920–21 (D. Or. 1925) (rely-
ing on a number of race classification experts to declare Armenians white). In In re Najour, 
the court utilized a text by Dr. A.H. Keane dividing the world into four races: “Negro or 
black . . . ; Mongol or yellow . . . ; Amerinds (red and brown) . . . ; and Caucasians” (includ-
ing those from North Africa, Europe, Iran, India, Western Asian and Polynesia, and Syri-
ans). 174 F. 735, 735–36 (N.D. Ga. 1909). 
64 In re Halladjian, 174 F. at 843, 845. 
65 See Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at 812–13; In re Ellis, 179 F. at 1002–03; In re Halladjian, 174 
F. at 838. By contrast, one pertinent but odd immigration case involved a birth citizen of 
Chinese and English extraction who married a Chinese-East Indian medical student in 
Hong Kong. See Ex parte Hing, 22 F.2d 554, 555–56 (W.D. Wash. 1927). The Court’s co-
nundrum was to determine whether she had forfeited her citizenship by marrying some-
one who was not eligible for naturalization. See id. The Court noted the Islamic marriage 
ceremony performed in China “may be very primitive,” and would not be legally valid if it 
was not in accord with Chinese law, regardless of whether she had converted to Islam or 
lived in a common law marriage. See id. at 556. Thus, the court granted the returnee’s ha-
beas petition. Id. 
66 In re Halladjian, 174 F. at 841. 
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tion.67 Indeed, Judge Lowell repeated the charge circulating in popular 
culture that Turks stole the most promising European boys to raise 
them as “Mohammedans” and he commented, seemingly approvingly, 
on the resistance of the Armenians “‘[a]gainst black pagans, Turks and 
Saracens.’”68 In other cases, Armenians and Syrians were permitted to 
immigrate because of Turkish oppression—Yerwand Karamian, an Ar-
menian Persian, received habeas corpus from the federal court because 
he was “‘burned from the hip to the knee with a hot steel rod’” to force 
him to convert to Islam.69 Ossana Soghanalian, a Christian Turk, re-
ceived a literacy exemption because, according to her testimony, all of 
the Christians from her home town had been killed or deported by 
Turkish Muslims and she was kept in a harem for over three years.70 
III. Islam in the American Courts: Conflicting Themes 
 Suzan Jameel Fakahani argues that American intellectuals in the 
late nineteenth century were largely dependent on British secondary 
sources for their knowledge of Islam, such as George Sale’s Koran, a 
translation that “purposely manipulated information in such a way as to 
present the Qur’anic message as trite and untrustworthy” and “greatly 
lacked in dignity and depth of the original.”71 Unfortunately, to the 
extent American courts cited Islamic texts, they were often from Sales’ 
Koran, perhaps the only English version available to most judges.72 Oth-
erwise, American judges’ references to Islam simply display little evi-
dence of familiarity with Islamic law or the Muslim faith. 
 In general, American courts’ portrayal of Islam veered between two 
extremes: some courts treated Islam as an exotic and occasionally primi-
tive religion that no average American would be likely to believe, while 
others described its believers as sincere and to be as equally respected as 
persons of other traditions. The courts occasionally attempted a brief 
discussion of substantive Islamic law, on the one hand citing favorably its 
stance on usury and on the other disparaging its stance on polygamy. 
Perhaps most interestingly, there are quite a number of church-state 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. at 839. 
68 Id. at 839, 841. 
69 United States ex rel Karamian v. Curran, 16 F.2d 958, 959, 962 (2d Cir. 1927). 
Though the court granted the habeas petition, it also decided that the petitioner should 
be deported. Id. 
70 Johnson v. Tertzag, 2 F.2d 40, 40–41 (1st Cir. 1924). 
71 Fakahani, supra note 31, at 300. 
72 See Van Veghten v. Van Veghten, 4 Johns. Ch. 501, 503 (N.Y. Ch. 1820); Wightman v. 
Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 349 (N.Y. Ch. 1820). 
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cases involving matters such as oath-taking by atheists and subsidization 
of public religious education where the courts suggest that Muslims are 
treated or should be treated equally with Christians. 
A. Schizophrenia: Islam as Hyperbole vs. Islam as Respected 
 As suggested, American courts in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries often reflected popular attitudes that Islam is among the 
exotic religions of the world not expected to be embraced by Ameri-
cans, while occasionally demonstrating respect for those who practice 
the religion. An example of such exoticism is evidenced in a Kentucky 
decision about interminable religious controversies among believers, 
such as the “race of Indians who . . . fought about the virtues of a mon-
key’s tooth, or those of the Mahometans about the mode of ablution 
. . . .”73 Along this vein, a number of American courts in this period 
used an Islamic reference as an exaggerated analogy to make their ar-
gument airtight, even though the case involved no Muslims or issues 
related to Islam.74 
 Perhaps the most blatant Muslim stereotype uttered by a twentieth 
century American court involved a mortgage foreclosure by an agricul-
tural coop on a loan to farmers for crop production.75 In dissenting on 
behalf of the farmers, Washington State Justice Millard castigated fed-
eral government coercion in agricultural programs of the time. He 
suggested that an argument appealing to force or prejudice rather than 
reason has no place in judicial decisions.76 Unfortunately, his analogy 
was to the Spanish conquest: 
In the year 711 A.D., the Moslem hordes overran Europe, first 
defeating the Visigoths in Spain. Those followers of Mahomet 
entered Europe with the Koran in one hand and a scimitar in 
the other. You had the option of giving at least lip service to 
the religion of those invaders or being liquidated. The offer 
of the federal official on behalf of the domestic enemy paral-
                                                                                                                      
73 Fisher v. Higgins, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 140, 144–45 (1827). 
74 See Peters v. United States, 94 F. 127, 134 (9th Cir. 1899) (quoting Engleman v. State, 
2 Ind. 91, 93–94 (1850)). Indeed, these hard-to-classify cases referred to Islam gratuitously. 
For example, in Engleman v. State, a defendant objected to an indictment because it omit-
ted the words “of our Lord” from the date “in the year of eighteen hundred and forty-six.” 
2 Ind. at 93. The court noted that neither the legislature nor judges felt the need to use 
this phrasing because “no mention is made of the Jewish, Mahometan, or other system of 
reckoning time, and all understand the Christian calender [sic] to be used.” Id. at 94. 
75 Sw. Wash. Prod. Credit Ass’n of Chehalis v. Fender, 150 P.2d 983, 984 (Wash. 1944). 
76 See id. at 994. 
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lels the right of choice tendered the Europeans by their for-
eign enemy.77 
 In the cases where Islam was used as an exaggerated analogy, the 
Qur’an (generally spelled “Koran”) sometimes served as an example of 
an exotic, difficult text for the courts.78 In Nubby v. Scott, for example, 
the court managed to insult two minorities at the same time in a con-
test over whether a “full-blood” daughter of the Native American Choc-
taw tribe, Scott, had the competence to convey her interest in part of 
her father’s estate to her mother, Nubby.79 Holding that Scott was in-
competent, the court noted that she “was a housewife” who “could not 
speak, read or write English,” and had the mind of a four-year-old.80 
The court further emphasized how unlikely it was that she would un-
derstand the deed, stating: “[t]he mere fact that this deed was read to 
her . . . imparted no more information to her, weak-minded and igno-
rant as she was, than would reading of the Koran to a Kangaroo.”81 
 Similarly, a Texas appellate judge adjudicating a dispute between  
the fire and police commissioners of San Antonio and its mayor and 
city council wished to point out the difficulty of discharging the com-
missioners under the city charter.82 He noted that, absent removal us-
ing the due process required in the charter, “no order of the mayor, 
though it were written, as the Koran, with a quill from a wing of the an-
gel Gabriel, can remove him from office.”83 Yet another court, in adju-
dicating a ship accident case, suggested that blaming God for placing 
the rock that the ship’s captain struck would be “a mahometan exten-
sion” of the phrase “act of God.”84 
 Occasionally, American judges commented on the fanciful or use-
less nature of the Qur’anic text.85 In United States v. Wong Chung, a fed-
eral judge objected to the flimsiness of hearsay used by an immigration 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Nubby v. Scott, 190 So. 911, 913 (Miss. 1939). 
79 Id. at 912–13. 
80 Id. at 913. 
81 Id.; see also Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83, 97 (Pa. 1854) (rejecting an analogy to English 
law on the basis that the statute being interpreted “has no more reference to the English 
law, or to the law of any other foreign state, than it has to the Mahometan religion”). 
82 Callaghan v. McGown, 90 S.W. 319, 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905). 
83 Id. at 327. 
84 Fergusson v. Brent, 12 Md. 9, 23 (1857). 
85 See United States v. Wong Chung, 92 F. 141, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1899); Steel Clad Bath 
Co. v. Mayor, 77 F. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1896), rev’d sub nom. Steel-Clad Bath Co. v. Davison, 
80 F. 904 (1897). 
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collector to deny a Chinese student entrance into the United States and 
complained that the hearsay was 
“such stuff as dreams are made on,” and the collector could 
have justified his course as well by asserting that it was dictated 
by a communication from the spirit world, or that it was sup-
ported by the revelations of the Koran. No man whose brain is 
in a normal condition would regulate the most trivial affairs of 
life upon such information.86 
Likewise, in a bathtub patent infringement suit, Judge Coxe of the 
Southern District of New York pointed out that patent law would be-
come ridiculous if an infringer’s slight design modifications could ne-
gate patent protection.87 He noted that “[t]o inform an inventor that 
he has a valid patent and so construe it afterwards that it is of no more 
practical use than a page of the Koran, is neither a logical nor an equi-
table position for the court to assume.”88 
 Courts also cited the Qur’an when demonstrating a clear non se-
quitur. Judge Masterson of the Supreme Court of Texas upheld a plain-
tiff’s right to sue on a debt payable in stock and stated that to cite to 
one particular case involving bribery “would be as logical and as appro-
priate to read a chapter from the Koran.”89 Similarly, the Ohio Su-
preme Court decided that a Kentucky statute printed on a warehouse 
receipt had nothing to do with the legal status of the receipt and exag-
gerated that, “except to facilitate deception, that act had no more to do 
with the receipt than a chapter from the Koran.”90 In New York, a plain-
tiff’s lawyer illustrated that the clerk of court could decide an answer’s 
validity by noting that “[i]f a writing, denying the existence of the Ko-
ran, or stating any other absurd or irrelevant matter, but sworn to . . . 
and called an answer, had been served,” then the clerk could rule that 
the defendant had not answered.91 
 The Qur’an played into reductio ad absurdum arguments in cases 
involving church and other property disputes.92 In the South Carolina 
case of Harmon v. Dreher, church congregational partners disagreed on 
                                                                                                                      
86 92 F. at 142–43; see also McDonough v. First Nat’l Bank of Houston, 34 Tex. 310, 318 
(1871). 
87 Steel Clad Bath Co., 77 F. at 738. 
88 Id. 
89 McDonough, 34 Tex. at 318. 
90 Ensel v. Levy, 19 N.E. 597, 600 (Ohio 1889). 
91 Philips v. Prescott, 9 How. Pr. 430, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854). 
92 See Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 30 (1868); Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 
87, 124 (1843). 
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the sect to which the church belonged.93 The court attempted to show 
the absurdity of allowing a majority of the congregation to change the 
doctrinal stance of the congregation in contravention of its founding 
theology. The court posited: 
Suppose a majority should next year spring up in favor of the 
Roman Catholic or Mohammedan Religion, and introduce 
auricular confession and indulgences, or the Koran, into this 
congregation, would not these defendants, however small a 
minority they might form, see and feel that their liberties were 
trampled on, by so gross a violation of the contract of associa-
tion contained in their charter?94 
Similarly, a New Hampshire court suggested how silly it would be if a 
court could not enjoin a dissenting congregation from turning its meet-
ing house into a “Mohammadan mosque,” synagogue, or even a place of 
public amusement.95 And a South Carolina court suggested how “per-
verted” a charter might be “from its original design” if a “Jewish syna-
gogue . . . were to be converted into a Turkish mosque.”96 
 Among other examples, Wilson v. Presbyterian Church of St. John’s 
Island and Wadmalaw involved a trust to pay a “minister of the Gospel” 
who adhered to the “Westminster confession of faith.”97 The court gave 
an example of when a judge might appropriately find that a pastor 
failed to adhere to “right doctrine.”98 It would be an easy inquiry, the 
court suggested, “if the pastor had openly declared his disbelief in the 
Westminster confession of faith, and avowed his belief in the doctrines 
of the Koran and preached them to his congregation.”99 So too, in con-
sidering the extent of Congress’ limited power to lay taxes, a Kansas 
Court of Appeals cited Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Consti-
tution of the United States in noting that a tax for objects “wholly extrane-
                                                                                                                      
93 See 17 S.C. Eq. at 91, 96–98. 
94 Harmon, 17 S.C. Eq. at 124; see also Klix v. Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Par-
ish, 118 S.W. 1171, 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909) (quoting the passage from Harmon); Trustees 
of the Organ Meeting House v. Seaford, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 457, 459–60 (1830) (holding 
that, in a congregational schism case, the original congregation keeps the land, but noting 
that, “[w]hether the grantor would have any claim to it, in case the church were to become 
Mahometan or Pagan, or profess their belief in the heathen mythology, I am not now, nor 
shall I ever be called upon to give an opinion”). 
95 Hale, 53 N.H. at 30. 
96 State ex rel Ottolengui v. Ancker, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 245, 268–69 (1846). 
97 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 192, 192–93 (1846). 
98 Id. at 215. 
99 Id. at 217–18. 
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ous, (as, for instance, for propagating Mahometanism among the Turks 
. . .)” is beyond the taxing power of Congress.100 
 The Mississippi Supreme Court further pressed the notion that 
Islam strays far from Christian or Jewish religions by illustrating when a 
diversion of a bequest—in this case, to a Greek school—would violate a 
testator’s intent.101 The Court described two examples that would go 
too far: a bequest by a Jew for “an assembly for reading the Jewish laws” 
would violate the testator’s intent if used to support a Christian 
preacher and chapel, or “a Moslem school for the instruction of Turk-
ish girls in the principles of the Koran.”102 Though the gift was arguably 
within the cy pres construction of the will, “no one could for a moment 
pretend that that was what the testator meant.”103 
 Occasionally, courts attempted to suggest a gulf between Qur’anic 
and common legal and religious principles. Perhaps the highest profile 
example is Justice Frankfurter’s U.S. Supreme Court citation of John 
Quincy Adams’s address celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Wash-
ington’s inauguration to explain the founding fathers’ views on inter-
national relations with non-Christian nations.104 President Adams con-
trasted the Christian view of the state of nature as “‘a state of peace’” 
with the “‘Mahometan law of nations, which considered the state of na-
ture as a state of war—an Asiatic law of nations, which excluded all for-
eigners from admission within the territories of the state . . . .’”105 In 
Dainese v. United States, one of a number of cases involving the rights of 
“Christians residing or traveling in Mohammedan countries,” the court 
                                                                                                                      
100 Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Independence, 79 F.2d 32, 39 (10th Cir. 1935) (quot-
ing 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 382 
(1st ed. 1833)). 
101 Nat’l Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 148 So. 649,650, 654 (Miss. 1933). 
102 Id. 
103 Id.; see also Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191, 202–03 (1871). As another odd example, 
see Pelton v. Ward, where the Supreme Court of New York noted that it would not be slan-
derous to call someone a “Mahometan, or a jacobin.” 3 Cai. 73, 79–80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) 
(Livingston, J., dissenting). In In re Taylor’s Estate, the court decided that the American 
Bible Society (ABS) is not an institution incorporated only for purposes of public charity 
simply because it distributes sectarian King James Bibles. See 40 N.E.2d 936, 937–38 (Ohio 
1942). The Court attempted to illustrate the absurdity of the ABS’s view that it is a public 
charity by suggesting that, if the distribution were of the Koran or the teachings of Buddha 
or Confucius, the non-existence of a public charity would be obvious notwithstanding the 
relationship between religion, morality, and knowledge, values that are necessary for good 
government. See id. at 938. But see Executors of Joseph Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 283 (1835) 
(noting the right of denominations, including Mahometans, to associate and be equally 
protected in building their houses of worship). 
104 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 n.8 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
105 Id. 
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noted the “radical distinction between Mohammedanism” and Western 
legal systems grounded in “Roman law and Christian civilization.”106 
One New York Court of Appeals judge, dissenting in Marshall v. Moseley, 
attempted to explain why the history of English law on the respective 
rent rights of a life tenant and a remainderman was not binding on 
American courts. The judge opined that English property law is as in-
compatible with American social and political values “as many of the 
maxims of the Koran are with the genius of Christianity.”107 A New Jer-
sey chancellor similarly suggested that the religious difference between 
“the pagan, the mahometan, the christian, and the Jew, is radical and 
irreconcilable.”108 
 On the other hand, a few courts attempted to show respect for 
Muslims and Islam, although sometimes they did so almost backhand-
edly. As one consistent theme of respect, courts noted the sincere and 
steadfast adherence of Muslims to the Qur’an as the binding principle 
of their lives. For example, in Dainese, the court acknowledged the Is-
lamic view that “the Koran [is] the only source of human legislation 
and the only law for the government of human affairs . . . .”109 Similarly, 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals suggested that an attack on a state po-
litical convention decision would be “as if the Mohammedan should 
doubt the Koran . . . .”110 Other courts used the Qur’an as a metaphor 
for the common law when noting an English judge’s reliance on Black-
stone’s Commentaries, which were “believed to be as unchanged and 
unchangeable as the Koran.”111 Perhaps the most backhanded attempt 
to praise the Qur’an occurred in Ellis v. Newbrough, where a fallen-away 
“Faithist” attempted to sue his religious community for luring him in 
and taking his property.112 In finding that the convert was not deceived, 
the court compared the sacred writings of this cult to the Qur’an and 
the Pilgrim’s Progress, which “deal[] largely in figures and tropes and 
                                                                                                                      
106 15 Ct. Cl. 64, 71 (1879). 
107 Marshall v. Moseley, 21 N.Y. 280, 281–92 (1860) (Clerke, J., dissenting). 
108 Hendrickson v. Shotwell, 1 N.J. Eq. 577, 674 (1832). The Court went on to note 
that the Christian and Jew “worship the same God; but one approaches him through a 
Mediator, whom the other regards as an imposter; and hence, there can be no commun-
ion or fellowship between them.” Id. 
109 15 Ct. Cl. at 71. 
110 Cain v. Page, 42 S.W. 336, 337 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897); see also Twombly v. Smith, 55 P. 
254, 259 (Colo. 1898) (quoting Cain, 42 S.W. at 337). 
111 Merrick v. Giddings, 11 D.C. (MacArth. & M.) 55, 64 (1879). This passage is quoted 
in Berlet v. Weary. 93 N.W. 238, 240 (Neb. 1903). 
112 27 P. 490, 490 (N.M. 1891). 
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allegories. But, read in the light of modern sciences, they are beautiful 
in their very simplicity.”113 
 In terms of how the courts believed that Islam was viewed in 
American social life in this period, one of the most painful cases— 
reminiscent of the argument made in Palmore v. Sidoti—is also one of 
the most recent. 114 In In re Wing, a mother who converted to Islam ap-
plied to change both her daughter’s name and her own to Islamic 
names so that her child could fit in with other Muslims with whom she 
attended religious school.115 In rejecting the request for the child’s 
name to be changed using the best interest of the child standard, the 
court noted: 
[S]uch change may have an adverse effect. This child has 
other family ties. She attends public school. She was born in 
this country and is a citizen thereof. While the mother may 
choose a religion and a name to suit her own purposes, she 
should not be permitted to adopt, with the court’s approval, a 
name for her infant daughter that will set her apart and seem 
strange and foreign to her schoolmates and others with whom 
she will come in contact as she grows up.116 
B. What Courts Knew (or Thought They Did) About Islamic Law 
 Most commonly, when American courts in this period attempted to 
describe substantive Islamic law, they focused on usury and domestic 
relations. There were, however, isolated discussions on a few other issues 
such as the prohibition of alcohol and the responsibility for ablution 
(washing) before prayer.117 As might be expected, courts cited the Is-
lamic laws on usury and temperance favorably, while considering Islamic 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. at 493. 
114 See 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). In Palmore, the Supreme Court decided that a change 
of custody could not be based on the social stigma a child might suffer when her white 
mother married an African-American man. See id. 
115 157 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334–35 (City Ct. 1956). 
116 Id. at 335–36. The Court gave the mother leave to renew her petition when the 
child was sixteen and old enough to decide for herself what name she wanted. See id. at 
336. But see Pelton, 3 Cai. at 79–80 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (noting that it would not be 
libelous to call someone a “Mahometan, or a jacobin”). 
117 See Harmon v. Dothan Nat’l Bank, 64 So. 621, 624 (Ala. 1914); infra notes 128–129 
and accompanying text. The court likened a mortgage foreclosure to Muslim worship, 
noting “the mortgagee need not, before approaching the auction block, cleanse his heart 
of all covetousness, as the pious Mussulman cleanses his body before entering a mosque.” 
Id. 
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law on polygamous marriage, like the similar Mormon views, scandal-
ous. 
 There are a fair number of cases that referred to Islamic law in dis-
cussing usury, though courts were not clear about the nature of the 
prohibition. Traditionally, Islamic law prohibited the lending of money 
with unjustified increase (riba), ambiguity (gharar), or risk.118 The 
American courts of this period were not sure whether Islamic law pro-
hibited any interest or only excessive interest but, in any case, cited Is-
lamic law as a ground for upholding public policy against usury, even 
when there was no prohibitory statute. A later example where the court 
cited Corpus Juris is State ex rel Embry v. Bynum, in which Alabama at-
tempted to shut down a loan shark business: 
It seems that the taking of interest for the loan of money, or at 
least taking excessive interest, has been regarded with abhor-
rence from the earliest times. We are told that such usury was 
prohibited by the early laws of the Chinese and Hindus, and 
by the Koran. The Mosaic law prohibited the Jews from exact-
ing interest on loans to their brethren, but permitted interest 
to be taken from Gentiles.119 
A New Hampshire court mentioned the Qur’an along with the Old Tes-
tament, Aristotle, “and the Ancient Fathers” in condemning inflexible or 
oppressive rates of interest.120 For some courts, these similarities were 
surprising—a dissenting judge in a Kentucky prosecution felt com-
pelled to note that it is “‘a little singular’” that the Roman and Euro-
pean laws against usury “‘have been raised in the laws of China, in the 
Hindu Institutes of Menu, [and] the Koran of Mahomet . . . .’”121 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Ali Adnan Ibrahim, The Rise of Customary Businesses in International Financial Mar-
kets: An Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of International Integration, 23 Am. U. 
Int’l L. Rev. 661, 664 (2008). 
119 9 So. 2d 134, 139 (Ala. 1942) (quoting 66 C.J. Usury § 5 (1934)) (noting that the pol-
icy is also supported by divine authority, namely Exodus 22, as well as Athenian, Roman, 
European, and English law); see also Sherwood v. Roundtree, 32 F. 113, 124 (S.D. Ga. 1887) 
(citing the Qur’anic rule against usury along with Chinese, Hindu, and “the laws of all na-
tions that we know of”); Willis v. Buchman, 199 So. 892, 896 (Ala. 1940); Dunham v. Gould, 
16 Johns. 367, 376–77 (N.Y. 1819) (citing the Qur’anic rule against usury along with Chinese, 
Hindu and “the laws of all nations that we know of” except for the Athenian Republic); Win-
stel v. American Loan Co., 30 Ohio N.P. 537, 539 (1933); Wessel v. Timberlake, 116 N.E. 43, 
46 (Ohio 1916) (citing similar laws as well as Abraham Lincoln); Wheeler v. Remedial Loan 
Co. of Phila., 25 Pa. D. 793, 796 (1916). 
120 See Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42, 45 (1819). 
121 Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3, 6–7 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933) (quoting Dunham, 
16 Johns. at 376). 
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 By contrast, when courts discussed women’s issues, they sorted into 
those that understood Muslim women’s marital situation to be tyranni-
cal and backward, and those that favorably compared women’s rights in 
Islam, albeit with insulting language.122 On one hand, the New York 
Chancery Court rejected a consensual divorce by noting that, to find 
legal authority for a “dangerous relaxation of the marriage tie” not 
“tolerated among the Christian nations,” one must “go, in search of 
such loose notions of the obligation, to the half-civilized people of Asia, 
where polygamy prevails” and there is “an almost unlimited freedom of 
divorce.”123 And Chief Justice Merrick of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
dissented in a choice-of-law case about the inheritance rights of an out-
of-wedlock child by noting that “[t]he child of the fourth wife of the 
Mohamedan, and the child perhaps of the thirtieth wife of the Mor-
mon, have the status of legitimacy in their own countries” but not in the 
United States. 124 
 On the other hand, a couple of courts remarked on the relatively 
enlightened Islamic view of women’s rights in inheritance. In Young v. 
Newsom, the court compared the common law’s unjust assumption that 
men owned their wives’ property, making wives their “chattel,” with a 
relatively more enlightened view protecting even “those [women] living 
in semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran.”125 Less 
insultingly, at least to Muslims, the New Hampshire Superior Court 
noted that marriage is a civil and not religious institution, as recognized 
by “every religion, whether pagan, mahometan, jewish, or christian.”126 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Van Veghten v. Van Veghten, 4 Johns. Ch. 501, 503 (N.Y. Ch. 1820); Young v. 
Newsom, 104 S.E. 660, 661 (N.C. 1920) (Clark, J., concurring). 
123 Van Veghten, 4 Johns. Ch. at 502–03 (citing Sale’s Koran and other English translations 
of foreign laws); see also In re Estate of Nakuapa, 3 Haw. 342, 352 (1872) (Hartwell, J., dissent-
ing) (remarking on the more common adoption of heirs “in eastern countries where plural-
ity of wives is allowed, [and] where a laxity in the marriage tie exists”). 
124 Scott v. Key, 11 La. Ann. 232, 241 (1856) (Merrick, C.J., dissenting); see also Royal v. 
Cudahy Packing Co., 190 N.W. 427, 427–28 (Iowa 1922) (granting a worker’s compensa-
tion award to a citizen of the Ottoman Empire, even though she was married “according to 
Mohammedan law,” because her marriage was not polygamous—but noting that Muslims 
were permitted to have up to four wives). 
125 104 S.E. at 661 (Clark, J., concurring); see also Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 210 
(N.C. 1920). 
126 Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester, 2 N.H. 268, 278 (1820); see also State v. 
Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 142 (1835) (noting that unlike the Romans and Turks, the Jews, the pa-
gans, Greeks, and “Mahometans” permitted only one kind of divorce). Another interesting 
case involving interreligious prejudice is Kupau v. Richards, in which an elder of the 
Church of Latter Day Saints who was denied a tax exemption for Christian clergymen ad-
mitted that his church believed in the New Testament and polygamy but denied that he 
was “a Mohammedan” or “accept[ed] the Koran.” See 6 Haw. 245, 245–46 (1879). 
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The court, however, did go on to disparage the opposing Catholic view 
of marriage as a sacrament, describing it as “one of the corruptions of 
popery.”127 
 One can also find singular references to courts’ views of other Is-
lamic legal rules. The Indiana Supreme Court, holding that a law pro-
hibiting alcohol was unconstitutional, noted that “Mahomet” was the first 
to prohibit alcohol as “part of his religious creed” while Jewish and 
Christian communities forbade only excessive drinking.128 Since this 
“law of Mahomet” was not “adopted by civilized nations” until recent 
times, the Indiana court considered it inapposite to the law’s constitu-
tionality.129 
 In the area of real property, the courts opined on Islamic law in 
ways that reflect both respect and prejudicial ignorance. As an example 
of the former, in justifying the Fifth Amendment’s rule against depriva-
tion of private property for public use, three different state courts nar-
rated the story of the Sultan Mustapha.130 According to the story, 
Mustapha complied with his Mufti’s pronouncement that he could not 
simply take the property of a Jew to build a mosque and must pay him 
full rent, because the Prophet held that private property was sacred.131 
 The Maryland Court of Appeals resolved an inheritance matter—in 
which family members died together in a flood—by referring to Roman 
and French law, as well as “the Mahometan law of India” which pre-
sumes that all relatives who die together die “at the same moment.”132 
On the other hand, Justice Campbell referred to Islamic waqf (or “va-
kuf,” as he spelled it) law that he claimed leaves three quarters of all 
property under dead-hand control and fails to contribute to public wel-
fare.133 This is because property owned by mosques and charities is not 
alienable except on behalf of the “Uelmas [who] are both priests and 
                                                                                                                      
127 Town of Londonderry, 2 N.H. at 278. 
128 Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 550, 556–57 (1855). 
129 Id. An appellant in a U.S. Supreme Court similarly referred to the Islamic prohibi-
tion against alcohol in upholding state liquor restrictions under the Commerce Clause. 
Fletcher v. Rhode Island, 46 U.S. 504, 542, 546 (1847). 
130 See Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258, 261–62 (1857); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 
S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 60 (1796) (Waties, J., concurring); Whidbea White v. Nashville & Nw. 
R.R. Co., 54 Tenn. 518, 537 (1872). 
131 Newby, 25 Mo. at 261–62. 
132 Cowman v. Rogers, 21 A. 64, 65 (Md. 1891); see also In re Estate of Nakuapa, 3 Haw. at 
353 (noting that the English permitted “Mohamedan, Hindoo and Gentoo” inheritance 
law to be retained alongside English law in India) (Hartwell, J., dissenting). 
133 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 370 (1855) (Campbell, J., dissenting); Matheny v. 
Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361, 399–400 (1856) (Bartley, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dodge, 59 U.S. 
at 370). 
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lawyers,” not unlike the oppressive corporations in Ohio.134 Islam also 
entered the discussion of validity of a slavery contract when a Massachu-
setts appellate court remarked that both “Mahometans” and Christians 
have held “that the whole race of infidels might rightfully be reduced, 
by fire and sword,” to slavery, “to the disgrace of human nature.”135 
C. Religious Equality for Islam in America 
 By far the most common references to Islam occurred in church 
and state cases, in which courts adjudicated claims that state law pre-
ferred the Protestant or Christian religion over others. As a general 
rule in these cases, courts stressed the equality of the Muslim faith be-
fore the law, even in those cases where they ultimately decided that a 
preference for the Protestant religion is constitutional. For example, in 
Perry v. Commonwealth, the General Court of Virginia pronounced the 
ringing protections of the Virginia Bill of Rights: 
Declaring to the Christian and the Mahometan, the Jew and 
the Gentile, the Epicurean and the Platonist, (if any such 
there be amongst us,) that so long as they keep within its pale, 
all are equally objects of its protection; securing safety to the 
people, safety to the government, safety to religion; and (leav-
ing reason free to combat error) securing purity of faith and 
practice far more effectually than by clothing the ministers of 
religion with exclusive temporal privileges . . . .136 
 Perhaps the oddest attempt to declare the equality of all religions is 
found in Herold v. Parish Board of School Directors.137 In surveying the vari-
ous versions of the Bible—such as the King James, Douai, and Luther 
Bibles—the court also added “the Rabbinical Bible” and “the Koran, 
often called the Mohammedan Bible.”138 Although recognizing varia-
tions among these “bibles,” the court determined that it was not within 
its province to describe the differences but that they were immaterial to 
the controversy.139 
 The most frequent declaration of the equality of Muslims during 
these years came in oath cases, in which atheists challenged refusals to 
admit their testimony in court. In these cases, the courts generally 
                                                                                                                      
134 Dodge, 59 U.S. at 370. 
135 Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 358, 365–66 (1810). 
136 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632, 642 (1846). 
137 68 So. 116, 117 (La. 1915). 
138 Id. 
139 See id. 
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ruled, in accordance with English law, that “infidels who do not believe 
in a God, or if they do, do not think that he will either reward or pun-
ish them in the world to come, cannot be witnesses . . . because an oath 
cannot possibly be any tie or obligation upon them.”140 Unlike atheists, 
however, “Mahometans” believe in rewards and punishments in the after-
life, and therefore, “may be sworn on the Koran,” just as Jews may be 
sworn on the Pentateuch and other religions with concepts of the after-
life may be sworn according to their customs.141 
 The most ringing yet still derogatory defense of the rights of Mus-
lims and other non-Christians comes in cases adjudicating blasphemy.142 
In State v. Chandler—a case that rings familiar in the modern era regard-
ing controversy about riots provoked by insults to the Prophet 
Mohammad—the court considered whether a defendant may be con-
victed for saying that the virgin Mary was a whore and Jesus Christ a bas-
tard.143 In a lengthy historical discursus distinguishing the right of the 
individual not to be punished for blasphemy because of honest views 
and the right of the state to punish someone whose malicious blas-
phemy causes potential civil unrest, Chief Justice Clayton of the Dela-
ware General Sessions Court posed an extended hypothetical involving 
both Muslims and Jews.144 
 What if, the court suggested, the majority of Delaware citizens 
should adopt the Jewish or Mahometan religion? What if the Christian 
should proclaim “the religion of Mahomet, or the impostures of Joe 
                                                                                                                      
140 Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 69 (1828); Perry, 44 Va. at 638. 
141 Tuttle, 18 Johns. at 103; see also United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799–800 (W.D. 
Wash. 1916) (noting that a Gentoo is sworn by touching his hand to the foot of a Gentoo 
priest, and a Chinese person by breaking a china saucer); Atwood, 7 Conn. at 69, 85 (not-
ing that Mahometan and Jewish “ideas of a future state are . . . very indistinct and loose” 
and that a person’s reputation for truth is a more reliable test for a witness than his faith, 
because a Christian will not have any confidence “in the testimony of a Mahometan, who 
believes that paradise is his inevitable portion”); Cent. Military Tract R.R. Co. v. Rockafel-
low, 17 Ill. 541, 553–54 (1856); Gill v. Caldwell, 1 Ill. 53, 53–54 (1822); People ex rel Bryant 
v. Zimmerman, 150 N.E 497, 499 (N.Y. 1926) (quoting Webster’s dictionary for the defini-
tion of a promissory oath as “‘a solemn appeal to God, or, in a wider sense, to some supe-
rior sanction or a sacred or revered person (as . . . the Koran . . .) in witness of the inviola-
bility of a promise or undertaking’”); Thurston v. Whitney, 56 Mass. 104, 109–10 (1848) 
(suggesting that the belief in the obligation of an oath is the correct test for witness com-
petency, rather than a witness’s religion); Commonwealth v. Kipnis, 26 Pa. D. 927, 932 
(1917); Arnold v. Estate of Arnold, 13 Vt. 362, 367–68 (1841) (noting that a mahometan 
may feel his oath “as binding upon his conscience, as the most devout Christian”). 
142 See State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 568 (1837). 
143 See id. at 553; Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, The Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the 
New European Freedom of Speech, 40 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 253, 260–63 (2010). 
144 See Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 566–72. 
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Smith, . . . . forsak[ing] the faith of their forefathers for such miserable 
delusions”?145 While the right of the individual to change religion is 
preserved by the Constitution, the court asked whether anyone could 
doubt that a statute punishing those who maliciously and loudly revile 
or ridicule the Prophet in public, calling him a bastard and his mother 
a whore, would be constitutional.146 Would the people have to suffer 
the insult of a man who would “gibbet[] the image of the prophet in 
view of the public, or burn . . . the koran by the hands of the common 
hangman?”147 The court concluded not, suggesting that the state may 
either punish all blasphemers, including those who insult the faith of 
minority Muslims, or none at all.148 
 Sometimes courts invoked the legal equality of Muslims when de-
termining the constitutionality of statutes allegedly establishing Chris-
tian or Protestant religions, although these opinions rarely found an 
establishment or equality violation.149 For example, in Caldwell v. State, a 
defendant brought a habeas corpus action after his conviction for work-
ing on Sunday in violation of Nebraska’s blue laws.150 His lawyer unsuc-
cessfully claimed that the law discriminated against minority religions, 
particularly Muslims who have to observe both Friday and Sunday as 
their days of rest, while Jews and Seventh Day Adventists were given an 
                                                                                                                      
145 See id. at 571. 
146 See id. at 568. 
147 See id. at 569. 
148 See id. at 579. People v. Ruggles is another blasphemy case, in which the defendant’s 
lawyer claimed that the Constitution requires toleration of all religious opinions and per-
mits only punishment of licentious conduct. See 8 Johns. 290, 291–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
Chief Justice Kent, responding to the argument, noted that such profane scoffing, like 
obscenity, injures the morals of children and violates decency and good order. Id. at 294–
95. Also note Commonwealth v. Kneeland, where the court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that the Constitution permits Muslims to ridicule the Christian religion and vice-
versa, and held that the defendant may be punished for impairing the veneration due to 
God with an injurious intent. See 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 210, 225 (1838). The dissent 
noted that the state Bill of Rights protects the right of “all who believe in the existence of 
God, as well Jews, Mahometans and Deists, as Christians of every denomination. But clearly 
does not include atheists.” Id. at 233 (Morton, J., dissenting). 
149 See Caldwell v. State, 118 N.W. 133, 135 (Neb. 1908). Two outlier cases involve 
Christian congregations that sued their neighbors for not ceding land to them for church 
extensions. See Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145, 145–47 (1853); Hills v. Miller, 3 
Paige Ch. 254, 254–55 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). The courts noted that displaying a preference for 
churches over property owners “would render it equally proper for the Court to disregard 
[property owners’ rights] if the object of the defendants was to erect a ‘Hall of Science,’ or 
a Turkish Mosque.” See Parish, 8 La. Ann. at 157 (quoting Hills, 3 Paige Ch. at 258–59). 
150 See 118 N.W. at 134. 
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exemption, permitting them to work Sunday if they take off Satur-
day.151 Making an assumption-of-risk argument, the court noted: 
                                                                                                                     
We doubt very much whether there were any disciples of Ma-
homet in Nebraska in 1873, and those who have emigrated to 
Nebraska since that day came here with full knowledge of the 
Sunday statute, and their appearance in our commonwealth 
will hardly render unconstitutional and void an act of the Leg-
islature that theretofore was valid.152 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on similar reasoning, distin-
guished between the constitutional freedom of religious worship and 
opinion—granted to all including Muslims—and the teaching of Protes-
tant Christianity which can be supported by the state.153 
 Similarly, in a few cases where taxpayers challenged the reading of 
scriptures in public schools, courts dismissed the notion that this read-
ing impermissibly favored the Christian religion.154 A Michigan court 
spoke for others in arguing that the use of the Bible as a reading text 
does not violate religious belief any more than if a “chapter of the Ko-
ran might be read,” which “would not be an affirmation of the truth of 
Mohammedanism, or an interference with religious faith.”155 
 
 
151 See id. at 135. 
152 Id. The Court also notes that Muslims can choose between Saturday and Sunday to 
work, just like everyone else. Id.; see also City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. 
(2 Strob.) 508, 525 (1846) (noting that while the state constitution abolished religious 
disabilities, so that “the Christian, Israelite, Mahometan, Pagan and Infidel, all stand alike,” 
the decisions of non-Christians to take a day other than Sunday off for work was not 
caused by the Sunday closing law but their own religion, and they must obey the law if they 
want to enjoy its benefits). 
153 Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 400, 407 (1810). 
154 See Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250, 252–53 (Mich. 1898); see also Minersville Sch. 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) (recognizing that individual convictions and the 
“[p]ropagation of belief . . . [are] protected, whether in church or chapel, mosque or syna-
gogue, tabernacle or meeting-house”). An interesting historical note—in one of the land-
mark Bible reading cases, Schempp v. School District of Abington Township, the district court 
noted that Ellory Schempp, the complaining student, displayed his objection to his school’s 
Bible reading and Lord’s Prayer rituals by silently reading a copy of the Koran. See 177 F. 
Supp. 398, 400–01 (E.D. Pa. 1959); see also Oliver v. Saint Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 
296, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (deciding a copyright infringement suit against a defendant who 
argued that the text was given to him from spiritual entities, like the Book of Mormon, the 
Qur’an, and the Bible); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 148 A.2d 63, 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1959) (discussing a deceit counterclaim by a university student sued for tuition 
based on failure of Columbia University to teach him wisdom as promised, where the student 
quoted from the Koran and other ancient texts to define wisdom). 
155 See Pfeiffer, 77 N.W. at 253; accord Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 399 (1854); 
State ex rel Freeman v. Scheve, 93 N.W. 169, 171 (Neb. 1903); see also Evans v. Selma Union 
High Sch. Dist., 222 P. 801, 803 (Cal. 1924) (permitting the King James version of the Bi-
28 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:1 
 Finally, Muslims were mentioned as equal citizens occasionally in 
challenges to taxes or tax-exempt status. In Executors of Joseph Burr v. 
Smith, the court noted the right of denominations, including “Maho-
metans,” to associate and be equally protected in building their houses 
of worship.156 Similarly, in Turpin v. Locket, which determined the con-
stitutionality of a public takeover of formerly established church lands, 
the court noted that religious freedom would not stop the legislature 
from permitting the majority of persons in a parish to choose their sect, 
even if they chose the “mahometan” religion.157 
Conclusion 
 Although cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
give only tantalizing hints of the views of U.S. judges about Muslims and 
Islam at the time, three common themes do emerge. First, Islam is seen 
as a “non-American” religion, one that most judges cannot contemplate 
any American adhering or converting to, unless he is already a Muslim 
immigrant. Indeed, some American judges seem to take a peculiar de-
light at poking fun at “Mohammadans” and their exotic views, often 
times with gratuitous comments. 
 Second, some courts find that Islamic or Ottoman law presents a 
valuable comparative perspective when they are attempting to show that 
a legal principle enjoys world-wide approval, such as the protection of 
private property or the moral odiousness of usury. That respect, how-
ever, does not extend to what some judges understood to be the Islamic 
law of marriage, although others did recognize that Islamic law protects 
women better than English common law in some property matters. 
 Third, despite their portrayal of the Islamic religion as “other” than 
American, the courts felt it necessary to repeat the principle that Mus-
lims are entitled to and receive religious liberty just like Jews, Christians, 
and all others. Indeed, they affirmed the principle even when justifying 
                                                                                                                      
ble to be purchased for the school library over an objection that it was sectarian, and not-
ing that the library may already have copies of the Koran, as well as the Talmud, the Douia 
Bible, or Confucius’s teachings). 
156 See 7 Vt. at 242. Two curious cases are In re McReynolds and In re Scottish Rite Building 
Co., in which the courts adjudicated appeals relating to tax-exempt status sought by Ma-
sons. See In re McReynolds, 1 B.T.A. 815, 820 (1925); In re Scottish Rite Bldg. Co., 182 N.W. 
574, 577 (Neb. 1921), overruled by Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Bd. 
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W. 93 (Neb. 1932). The courts distinguished ethical teachings 
from those of belief in a particular religion, referring to a “Mohammedan’s” required be-
lief in the Koran. See In re Scottish Rite Bldg. Co., 182 N.W. at 577; accord In re McReynolds, 1 
B.T.A. at 820. 
157 See Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. 113, 113–14, 151–52 (1804). 
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practices such as giving state tax dollars to Christian institutions, Chris-
tian prayer and Bible reading in schools, and Sunday blue laws. 
 The views expressed by the courts about Muslims and Islamic law 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus track com-
mon American stereotypes during this period, albeit they are somewhat 
less virulent and occasionally more respectful than the average Ameri-
can’s expressed views. It would be valuable to discover whether judicial 
views influenced social decisions, including Christian Americans’ deci-
sions about how to interact with Muslims, or Muslims’ views about the 
extent to which they had to conceal their religious identities. 
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